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Optimization of Robustness of Complex Networks
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Networks with a given degree distribution may be very resilient to one type of failure or attack
but not to another. The goal of this work is to determine network design guidelines which maximize
the robustness of networks to both random failure and intentional attack while keeping the cost of
the network (which we take to be the average number of links per node) constant. We find optimal
parameters for: (i) scale free networks having degree distributions with a single power-law regime,
(ii) networks having degree distributions with two power-law regimes, and (iii) networks described
by degree distributions containing two peaks. Of these various kinds of distributions we find that
the optimal network design is one in which all but one of the nodes have the same degree, k1 (close
to the average number of links per node), and one node is of very large degree, k2 ∼ N
2/3, where
N is the number of nodes in the network.
PACS numbers: 89.20.Hh, 02.50.Cw, 64.60.Ak
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been much interest in the resilience
of real-world networks to failure of nodes or to intentional
attacks [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. The goal of this work is to
determine network design guidelines which maximize the
robustness of the networks to both random failures of
nodes and attacks targeted on the highest degree nodes
[7].
Networks with a given degree distribution may be very
resilient to one type of attack but not to another. Con-
sider the simple seven node network example shown in
Fig. 1a. This network is relatively robust with respect
to a random failure - only a failure of the central node
will cause the network to fragment. Thus the probability
that a random failure will cause the network to fragment
is only 1/7. On the other hand the network is extremely
vulnerable to a targeted attack - an attack in which the
most highly connected nodes are removed first. In this
simple example the probability that a targeted attack
which removes one node will fragment the network is 1!
As shown in Fig. 1b we can modify the network to
make it more resilient to targeted attack by adding more
links between the nodes on the periphery of the network.
With this modification, neither a single node random fail-
ure nor a targeted attack which removes only one node
can fragment the network. This increased robustness,
however, comes with a cost. If we define the “cost” to
construct and maintain a network with a given number
of nodes as being proportional to the average number of
links 〈k〉 per node in the network, we see that the cost
of the original network is 12/7 while the cost of modified
network is 24/7. So for the additional robustness we pay
a factor of 2 in cost.
Our goal then becomes how to maximize the robust-
ness of a network of size N nodes to both random failures
and targeted attacks with the constraint that the cost
(a) (b)
<k>=12/7 <k>=24/7
FIG. 1: (a) Example of network with low tolerance to targeted
attack. (b) Example of a network with much higher tolerance
to targeted attack but with double the cost.
remains constant. That is, the number of links remains
constant but the nodes are connected in a different and
more optimal way.
Many real world computer, social, biological and other
types of networks have been found to be scale free, i.e.,
they exhibit degree distributions of the form P (k) ∼ k−λ
[8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. For large scale free
networks with exponent λ less than 3, it has been found
that, if nodes fail randomly, essentially all nodes must
fail for the network to become disconnected [3, 4]. On
the other hand, because the scale free distribution has
a long power-law tail (i.e. hubs with large degree), the
networks are vulnerable with respect to targeted attack.
This raises two questions that we address in this work:
(i) How can we optimize scale free networks to both ran-
dom failure and targeted attack and (ii) Are there other
network types that can be better optimized than scale
free networks. To this end, we begin our analysis with
scale free networks and then consider networks with other
types of distributions.
2II. OPTIMIZATION METRIC
The threshold for random removal of nodes for any
degree distribution, P (k), is [3]
f randc = 1−
1
κ0 − 1
, (1)
where κ0 ≡ 〈k
2〉/〈k〉.
Reference [5] describes how to calculate f targc , the
threshold under intentional attack.
A metric we can use to measure the robustness of the
network to both random and targeted attack is the sum
f totc = f
rand
c + f
targ
c . (2)
This is only one of a number of possible metrics we could
use, e.g., we could have used the product f randc · f
targ
c .
Our results are, in general, not dependent on the metric
chosen.
Our goal can now be stated as follows: for a network
of a given number of nodes N , how do we maximize f totc
while keeping the number of links constant?
We can estimate an upper bound for f totc . We first
note that the maximum value of f randc is essentially 1
which is the case when a small number of nodes have a
very large degree distribution – as in scale free networks
with λ < 3 or in the simplest case where one node is
linked to all other nodes. In these cases the probability
of these critical nodes randomly failing approaches zero
and the threshold is close to 1. The maximum value of
f targc is obtained in the situation in which all the nodes
have the same degree, 〈k〉, in which case the targeted
attack becomes equivalent to random failure and we can
use Eq. (1) to find f targc = 1 − 1/(〈k〉 − 1). Our upper
bound f¯ totc is therefore given by
f totc ≤ f¯
tot
c ≡ 2−
1
(〈k〉 − 1)
. (3)
III. POWER LAW DEGREE DISTRIBUTION
We first study how to optimize a scale free network
with a single power law regime by varying the exponent
λ and keeping 〈k〉 constant [17].
In Fig. 2, we plot the values of f randc , f
targ
c , and f
tot
c ,
for a range of the exponent λ for a network with N = 106
nodes and 〈k〉 = 3 [18]. For this choice of 〈k〉, the upper
bound of f totc is given by f¯
tot
c ≈ 1.5 [see Eq.( 3)]. We find
that: As λ increases, f targc increases but f
rand
c decreases.
For λ ≈ 2.5 f totc is optimized but the maximum value of
f totc (≈ 1.04) is small relative to the theoretical maximum
≈ 1.5. It is interesting that the network is optimized with
a value of λ about 2.5 which is consistent with the range
of exponents for many real networks [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16].
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FIG. 2: Random, targeted and total critical percolation
thresholds for scale free networks as a function of the ex-
ponent λ.
IV. DEGREE DISTRIBUTIONS FORMED BY
TWO POWER LAWS
We next analyze a slightly more complex form for P (k).
Keeping 〈k〉 constant, we consider degree distributions
which consist of 2 segments each of which is a power law.
The inflection point at which the distribution changes
slope we denote by a. The hypothesis is that the first
power law segment (for k < a) with exponent α will
contribute to the robustness against targeted attack and
the second segment (for k > a) with exponent λ will
contribute to the robustness against random failures. We
determine the relative weights of the two segments such
that fc-total is maximized. To maintain constant 〈k〉 as
we change a we again adjust the minimum, m, of the
distribution.
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FIG. 3: Total percolation threshold vs the inflection point a
for distributions P (k) composed of two scale free segments
with λ = 2.5 (for k > a) and for the slope (for k < a) α =
3, 4, 5, 10, 20, 30 (from right to left).
In Fig. 3, we plot the values of f totc as a function of the
inflection point a for λ = 2.5, 〈k〉 = 3 and for various α.
We see that f totc attains a maximum value that increases
with increasing α. Thus for a given λ we can maximize
3f totc by choosing appropriate values of a and α.
We can further increase the maximum value of f totc by
changing the value of λ. In plots (not shown) of f totc as
functions of a, for α = 10 and various values of λ, we
find that as λ decreases, the maximum value attained by
f totc increases. Thus we can maximize the robustness of a
network with respect to both random failure and targeted
attack by replacing the original degree distribution by
one with the same 〈k〉 but with two power law segments
characterized by exponents α and λ with α large and λ
close to one (the lowest value of λ which yields physical
results).
In these distributions with large values of α the total
probability in the tail of the distribution is a small frac-
tion of the total probability, so that there is only on the
order of one node in the tail and, due to the large value
of α, most of the nodes have almost the same number of
links – very close to the minimum m.
V. DEGREE DISTRIBUTIONS FORMED BY
AN EXPONENTIAL AND A POWER LAW
With the insight that the larger the exponent α the
better the optimization, we now consider distributions
with the initial power law segment (k < a) of the distri-
bution replaced by an exponential distribution P (k) ∼
ǫ−βk. As expected we find that for a given β, at some
value of a, f totc is optimized and that the optimization
increases as β increases.
VI. DEGREE DISTRIBUTION FORMED BY
TWO GAUSSIANS
Considering the previous cases, it appears that the op-
timization strategy does not depend on the fact that the
initial segment of the distribution is a power law or expo-
nential. Given that the total probability of the nodes in
the second segment (the tail of the distribution) is very
small (of order 1), as discussed above, we now want to
study the case where the second segment is not a power
law. We therefore consider here a case where the degree
distribution consists of two Gaussian segments.
One Gaussian has its center at k1 and width ω1 and the
second Gaussian has its center at k2 > k1 and width ω2.
The ratio r represents the fraction of the number of nodes
in the second Gaussian to the total number of nodes. We
consider cases in which r and k2 are the independent
variables and k1 must be a dependent variable in order
to maintain a fixed value of 〈k〉.
In plots (not shown) of the total threshold f totc in terms
of the ratio r for various values of k2, we find that the op-
timal f totc increases and the optimal value of r decreases
as the value of k2 increases. In addition, we obtain higher
values of the optimal f totc for smaller values of ω1. This
fact indicates that the highest value of f totc is achieved in
the limit where this width goes to zero. In this limit the
lower segment tends toward a simple delta function. This
observation motivates us to study next the optimization
of networks consisting of two delta functions .
VII. DEGREE DISTRIBUTIONS FORMED BY
TWO DELTA FUNCTIONS
Next we consider the degree distribution that consists
of two delta functions:
P (k) ≡ (1− r)δ(k − k1) + rδ(k − k2). (4)
As in the case of two Gaussian segments, we calculate
the total threshold as a function of r and k2 for a fixed
value of 〈k〉. We obtain analytical expressions for both
f randc and f
targ
c as follows.
Using Eq. (1),
f randc =
〈k〉2 − 2r〈k〉k2 − 2(1− r)〈k〉 + rk
2
2
〈k〉2 − 2r〈k〉k2 − (1− r)〈k〉 + rk22
. (5)
For the threshold for targeted attack, we must consider
two cases:
(i)f targc > r. In this case, after the targeted attack, the
only nodes that remain have degree k1. We find
f targc = r +
1− r
〈k〉 − rk2
{
〈k〉
〈k〉 − rk2 − 2 (1− r)
〈k〉 − rk2 − (1− r)
− rk2
}
.
(6)
(ii) f targc < r. For this case nodes are removed only
from the higher segment and we find
f targc =
〈k〉2 − 2r〈k〉k2 + rk
2
2 − 2(1− r)〈k〉
k2(k2 − 1)(1 − r)
. (7)
With the expressions for the thresholds, Eqs. (5), (6),
and (7), we are able to evaluate the total threshold f totc .
We can obtain an expression for the optimal value of k2
as a function of r by determining the value of k2 for which
f totc is maximized. Based on our results above, we expect
the maximum will be obtained for r small. Using Eqs. (5)
and (7), we find that for small r the optimal value of k2
can be approximated by
k2 ∼
{
2〈k〉2(〈k〉 − 1)2
2〈k〉 − 1
}1/3
r−2/3 ≡ Ar−2/3. (8)
Using this result and Eq. (3) we find, for small r,
f totc = f¯
tot
c −
3〈k〉
A2
r1/3 +O(r2/3). (9)
Thus f totc approaches the theoretical maximum value
when r approaches, but is not, zero. For a network of
N nodes, the maximum value of f totc is obtained when
r=1/N the smallest possible value consistent with there
being 1 node of degree k2. Given this r the equation
determining the optimal k2 is
k2 = AN
2/3. (10)
4Figure 4 demonstrates the behavior of the optimal f totc
as a function of r and k2. We see that the highest values
of the optimal f totc are attained as r approaches zero; and
for a given small value of r, f totc is optimized for k2 from
Eq. (10).
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FIG. 4: Contour plot of total percolation threshold vs r and k2
for distribution consisting of two delta functions with 〈k〉 = 3.
The general nature of our results hold for the metric
defined in Eq. (2) as well as for metrics f totc defined as a
linear combination of the random and targeted thresholds
f totc = af
rand
c + bf
targ
c , (11)
where a and b allow one to specify for a given network
the importance to be attached to random and targeted
attack respectively. The only modification to our results
for these alternative metrics, is that the prefactor A is
generalized to
A =
{
a
b
2〈k〉2(〈k〉 − 1)2
2〈k〉 − 1
}1/3
. (12)
VIII. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
We develop a strategy for optimization of scale free
and two-peaked networks against both random failures
and targeted attacks. To our knowledge, this is the first
study of the robustness of complex networks to multi-
ple types of failure/attack. We find that the network
which approaches the theoretical maximum level of opti-
mization is generated with a degree distribution which is
non-zero at only two values: k1 and k2. This level of op-
timization is possible because in order to obtain a value
of f randc which is essentially 1 we have to wire only 1 node
with a large number of links. The remaining nodes, all
with the same degree, provide essentially the same high
degree of resilience to targeted attack as for the case in
which all nodes have degree 〈k〉. Figure 5 compares the
level of optimization obtained for these optimized net-
works two-delta-function networks with the level of opti-
mization obtained for networks with two power laws seg-
ments and with the theoretical maximum values which
can be obtained.
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FIG. 5: Plots of the optimal f totc vs 〈k〉 for theoretical maxi-
mum value (solid line), two delta functions (dotted line), and
distributions consisting of two power law segments (see leg-
end)
The optimal network is obtained by connecting k2 ∼
AN2/3 nodes to a single node and all of the other
nodes except the degree k2 node are of degree k1 ∼
〈k〉 −A/N1/3 ∼ 〈k〉.
Subjects for further study include (i) an analysis of the
static and dynamic properties of the optimized two delta
function networks which we have identified here and (ii)
the optimization of complex networks under combined
random failure and targeted attack. Finally we note that
the origin of the N2/3 appearing in Eq. (10) may be re-
lated to the size of the infinite cluster at criticality for
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs [19, 20, 21].
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